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The Right of Appeal By Administrative
Authority From Adverse Judicial Rulings
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The Supreme Court of Ohio in a recent decision unanimously
ruled that the Ohio Department of Liquor Control, its Director,
and the Board of Liquor Control are without authority to appeal
from a decision of the Court of Common Pleas which reversed the
Board's order.'
Two cases were involved in that decision. The Director caused
a citation to issue against Corn, the holder of certain liquor permits,
to show cause why such permits should not be revoked. Subse-
quently, the Director rejected 'Corn's application for renewal of
the permits which were the subject of dispute in the citation case.
The hearing on the citation and the appeal from the order of the
Director refusing renewal were considered by the Board on the
same day and the order entered by it in each instance was adverse
to Corn.
The Court of Common Pleas reversed the Board on both rul-
ings, whereupon the Director, the Department, and the Board ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals which resulted in a reversal of the
lower court's decision. Then Corn appealed to the Ohio Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred
in overruling Corn's motion to dismiss the appeals by the adminis-
trative representatives inasmuch as leave to appeal must be con-
ferred by the Constitution or by statute and an examination of
those sources failed to disclose that the appellees were empowered
with the requisite authority. In construing the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act of Ohio,2 which is applicable to proceedings before the
Board, the Supreme Court decided that the right of appeal granted
by the Act is limited to those persons whose interests are subject
to adjudication by the Board. The Court concluded that neither the
Director, the Board, nor the Department was aggrieved by the ad-
verse ruling and that since the Board is essentially a quasi-judicial
body, comparable to a court, it is without the necessary interest
to appeal from a reversal of its rulings. The Court emphasized that
numerous Ohio agencies have been granted the right to appeal
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whereas no similar measures have been enacted with respect to the
Department of Liquor Control or its related divisions.
The Corn decision is of particular significance locally since its
effect is to deny any claim to a right of appeal that might be as-
serted by other state agencies which come under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act but which, like the Liquor Department, are un-
able to point to specific statutory authorization for appeal from ad-
verse judicial rulings.
Aside from its local import, the decision is noteworthy for it
adds to the growing list of cases of state courts which have denied
the right of administrative agencies to seek a review of reversals
of their rulings or orders. Obviously, the issue does not arise if
the legislature grants the power of appeal to an agency in clear
and explicit terms, for then the courts are prone to recognize
the legislative mandate.
The area of conflict manifests itself in those statutes which are
silent as to the matter of appeal or are couched in such ambiguous
terms that the legislative intent is unclear or unascertainable.
Judicial interpretation of such legislation has resulted in a diver-
gence of opinion. The result has been that slightly more than one
half of the courts of the several states have refused to grant an
agency the opportunity to defend its rulings in an appellate pro-
ceeding.3
In determining whether an agency is entitled to appeal, the
courts looked initially to the common law for a solution. Since it
is axiomatic that there was no right to appeal at common law,
the privilege must be evidenced by constitutional grant or legis-
lative enactment. To those courts which have denied the right, the
absence of a specific grant is conclusive since they are unwilling
to find the agency a "party aggrieved" or a "person interested"
within the meaning of general appellate statutes.4
Modem appeal procedure has been needlessly constricted by
some courts to the narrow limits of the adversary system, thus
limiting the resolution of conflicts to those of private litigants
whose interests are directly affected. Those courts have refused to
recognize the unique and distinctive nature of the administrative
agency, holding firm to the view that its adjudicative functions
give it the controlling characteristics of a judicial body. Therefore,
3 The annotation in 117 A.L.R 216 (1938), on the right of public boards
and officials to appeal from adverse rulings indicates that a majority of the
courts have denied the right. It lists 14 decisions against, and 6 in favor of
appeal. Taking into account the decisions which were not included in the
annotation and those rendered after 1938, a more accurate statement now
would be that the decisions denying the right maintain an almost negligible
majority.
4 Corn v. Board of Liquor Control, supra note 1.
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they reason that since a court has no interest in maintaining its
decisions at the appellate level, the agency is similarly bound.
On the other hand, those courts which sanction appeals by
agencies have not forced them into a Procrustean mold designed
initially for other purposes. They conceive of the administrative
body as a distinct organ of government only superficially analogous
to a court in its quasi-judicial functions. Thus, they have held that
although the agency's interest is not the same as the private
litigants', the administrative unit is sufficiently "aggrieved" as a
representative of the public interest to seek review of adverse
rulings under the general law governing appeals. Therefore, in
the absence of specific statutory prohibition, administrative appeals
have been allowed by them.,
ZOMNG BoARDs
The decisions of courts which have adjudicated the right of
a zoning board of appeals or adjustment to appeal from a reversal
of its order or ruling are especially representative of this judicial
conflict. This is true primarily because the statutes or ordinances
which create the zoning boards are relatively uniform from one
jurisdiction to another, and secondarily, because these decisions
articulate the cogent reasons favorable or unfavorable to the grant-
ing of such appeals.
It is the standard practice for a legislative body which promul-
gates zoning regulations to incorporate a provision for the establish-
ment of a zoning board of appeals or adjustment.6 The board's
primary function is to review the actions of the officials charged
with the administration and enforcement of the zoning regulations.7
As a general rule, it is also within the province of the board to al-
low deviations from the requirements of the zoning statute, if the
board, after due deliberation, concludes that adherence to the
strict letter of the regulations would result in unnecessary or un-
reasonable hardship to an individual.'
With minor variations, the statutes provide that any person
aggrieved by a decision of the zoning board may appeal to a specific
s An irrigation district was entitled as a person aggrieved to maintain an
appeal from an adverse ruling in the case of In re Heart River Irr. Dist. Stark
et al v. Heart River Irr. Dist., 77 N.D. 827, 47 N.W. 2d 126 (1951). The court
said at page 832, "An intention on the part of the legislature to deny the
right of appeal because of a failure or omission to provide therefor in a special
act will not be lightly assumed or inferred. The right to appeal is a substan-
tive right, and while it is purely statutory, a statute will not be construed as
taking away the right of appeal unless the language used clearly shows such
an intent."
68 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.228 et seq. (3rd ed. 1949).
7 Id., § 25.232.
8 Id. § 25.233.
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court which has authority to reverse, affirm, or modify the ruling.9
Generally, the statutes do not name the board as a party to the ap-
peal in the lower court by the person aggrieved or provide that
the board or the person aggrieved may appeal adverse rulings to
the higher courts.
Two cases have been repeatedly cited as authority for denying
zoning boards the right to appeal, namely, Miles v. McKinney, °
and Appeal of Board of Adjustment, Lansdowne Borough." In
each case the decision of the zoning board to grant a building per-
mit or exempt property owners from zoning restrictions was re-
versed and each board was unsuccessful in its attempt to obtain
a review of the reversal.
The zoning statute in the Miles case contained a unique pro-
vision that "an appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals from
any decision of the said court of Record reviewing the decision of
the Board of zoning appeals.' 2 (Italics added). In consonance with
the plain meaning of the statute, as this principle of legislative
interpretation was applied by the Maryland court, the provision
would seem to cover a decision adverse to the board as well as
one adverse to the private litigants. However, this language was
ignored by the court and its ruling, denying the agency a right
to appeal, was founded on the provision which authorized an ap-
peal by the person aggrieved. The court concluded that the board,
as a quasi-judicial body, is not "aggrieved" by a reversal of its
rulings.'3
9 The enabling act of Connecticut is typical. It provides:
"Any person or persons severally or jointly aggrieved by any decision of
said board, or any officer, department, board or bureau of any municipality,
charged with the enforcement of any order, requirement or decision of said
board, may ... take an appeal to the court of common pleas of the county
in which such municipality shall be located, which appeal shall be made
returnable to such court in the same manner as that prescribed for civil ac-
tions brought to such court. . . . The court, upon such appeal, and after
hearing thereon, may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may modify
or reverse the decision appealed from...." 1 CowN. Gmr. STAT. § 844 (1949).
10 174 Md. 551, 199A 540, 117 A.L.R. 207 (1938). This decision is sup-
ported by Boeder v. Brown, 65 A. 2d 333 (Md. Sup. Ct. 1949) and Knox v
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 180 Md. 88, 23 A. 2d 15 (1941).
11 313 Pa. 523, 170 Atl. 867 (1934).
12 A. CODE 1939 (Flack's 1951 ed.).; Art. 66 B, § 7 [Acts 1935, Ch. 448, p.
952].
13 In the Miles case, supra note 10 at 560, the Maryland Court said of the
function of the zoning board, "Such a function involves the exercise of dis-
creation and judgment and is in its nature judicial."
In the later case of Dal Maso v. Board of County Commissioners of Prince
George's County, 182 Md. 200, 34A, 2d 464 (1943), where the issue was not
the right of a zoning board to appeal but whether the board could rescind
one order and substitute another, the court rejected the judicial analogy and
held that the first order was not res judicata since the decisions of the board
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In the Lansdowne case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court de-
cided that the zoning board was not injuriously affected by the
decision which reversed its order, although several years earlier
the Court had held that a zoning board of the City of Pittsburgh
was entitled to be heard in court or to appear as a party to an
appeal. 1
4
Other jurisdictions have espoused the reasoning articulated in
these two decisions. Their denials of the right to appeal have been
based on one of the two following reasons:
1. The enabling act which provides for the creation of the
board does not list the right to appeal among its enumerated
powers.15
2. The general law governing appeals applies only to persons
aggrieved and therefore does not include the board which acts as
an impartial arbiter with no interest in the proceedings other than
to decide the question presented for determination. 6
In contrast to the opinions which have denied the right of
zoning boards to appeal are the decisions in Board of Adjustment
of City of Fort Worth v. Stovall17 and Rommell v. Walsh.'8
In the Stovall case the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that
the board was not entitled to appeal 9 but its decision was reversed
on the ground that the board is a proper representative of the pub-
are not judgments or decrees. The court said at page 205, "Administrative
boards and officials are arms and instrumentalities of the Legislature, and
are not judicial at all.. .. "14 In Appeal of Ward, 289 Pa. 458, 137 Atl. 630 (1927), the court stated that
in view of the statute allowing costs to be assessed against the board on
disposition of an appeal from its ruling, that it was entitled to be heard. The
statute under which the Pittsburgh zoning board was created has the following
provision as to costs: "Costs shall not be allowed against the board, unless it
shall appear to the court that it acted with gross negligence or in bad faith
or with malice in making the decision appealed from." PuRDoN's PA. STAT.
ANr. 1938 Trr. 53, § 10759 [Act of 1923, P.L. 122, § 9].
The statute involved in the Lansdowne case has the same provision as
to costs, PuRnoN's PA. STAT. AxN. 1931, Trr. 53, § 15737 [Act of 1923, P.L. 957, §
7], yet, the Lansdowne decision contains no reference to Appeal of Ward or any
suggestion that the board might be pecuniarily aggrieved on that basis.
Is State ex rel. Bringhurst v. Zoning Board of Appeal and Adjustment, 198
La. 758, 4 So.2d 820 (1941); Minnis v. Hamilton County Board of Zoning
Appeals, 89 Ohio App. 289, 101 N.E. 2d. 388 (1951); A. DiCillo and Sons, Inc.,
v. Chester Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Ohio St. 302, 109 N.E. 2d. 8 (1952);
Kearney v. Hazelton, 84 N. H. 228, 149 A. 78 (1930).
16 State ex rel. Bringhurst v. Zoning Board of Appeal and Adjustment,
198 La. 758, 4 So. 2d. 820 (1941); State ex rel. Hurley v. Zoning Board of Ap-
peal and Adjustment, 198 La. 766, 4 So. 2d. 822 (1941).
17 216 S. W. 2d. 171 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1949).
18 127 Conn. 16, 15 A. 2d. 6 (1940).
19 211 S. W. 2d. 303 (1948).
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lic interest in zoning proceedings. The Supreme Court of Texas
stated, "In determining whether a permit applied for under the
quoted ordinance shall be granted or denied, the board is engaged
in a delegated policy-making function, and is not merely adjudi-
cating private rights.... The public, as well as affected private
parties, has an interest in upholding the order of the board, if it is
valid, and the board itself is the proper party to represent the
public interest where its order is under review."' 20
The Connecticut Court, in the Rommell case, also rejected the
judicial analogy, indicating that in some instances the public in-
terest may not be directly involved but even then a court would
not be justified in dismissing the board as a party to the appeal
because it is a proper defendant at the institution of the proceed-
ings and therefore continues as a party even though it takes no
active part in the litigation. The position assumed here is unique,
going farther than other courts in allowing administrative appeal.
A number of courts which have denied the right of a zoning
board to appeal have recognized the power of the municipality to
seek a review of a reversal of the board's order.21 This is true even
though the municipality was not a party to the lower court pro-
ceeding. A building inspector, however, was denied similar recogni-
tion. 22
20Board of Adjustment of City of Fort Worth v. Stovall, 216 S. W. 2d.
171, 173 (1949).
21 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 51 A 2d.
273 (1947); Gilliam v. Etheridge, 67 Ga. App. 731, 21 S. E. 2d. 556 (1942);
Perelman v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Yeadon, 144 Pa. Super. 5,
18 A. 2d. 438 (1941).
In the Perelman case the court stated that the board of adjustment is
"sufficiently distinct from the legislative body of the borough as to prevent
the anomaly of a borough appealing from a reversal of its own ruling." Id. at 8.
22 In A. Di Cillo and Sons, Inc. v. Chester Zoning Board of Appeals, 158
Ohio St. 302 (1952), the Supreme Court of Ohio after denying the zoning board
the right to appeal stated at page 305 that, "Sufficient partisan representa-
tion of any interest of the public in warding off appellate attacks on the de-
cisions of the board can be furnished . . . by the administrative officer,
from whose decision an appeal to the board is authorized by statute .... "
Later, in Corn v. Board of Liquor Control, supra note 1, the same court
said at page 19, "However, in the opinion in the Di Cillo case there is no
indication that an administrative officer has a right of appeal in the absence
of a provision of the Constitution or statutes giving him one."
On the basis of the Corn decision, the Ohio Court of Appeals, Second
District, held that the duties of the building inspector are comparable to
those of the Director of Liquor Control who is not authorized to prosecute
an appeal from a judgment of the common pleas court. Union Cemetery
Association v. Franklin County Board of Zoning Appeals, No. 4948, July
1, 1953; In the Matter of the Appeal of the Union Cemetery Association
from the Decision of the Franklin County Building Inspector, No. 4949, July
1, 1953.
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It is interesting to observe that the courts indulge in protract-
ed reasoning when denying a zoning board the privilege of de-
fending its decision, yet they freely bestow the same privilege
on a municipality with little or no explanation. 23 Why a municipal-
ity is assumed to be a proper party for appeal, while its subdi-
vision, with like administrative responsibilities, is not, is difficult
to fathom, except for the emphasis given the adjudicative func-
tions of the board. Since the municipality and the board share in
initiating and implementing policy, each appears equally entitled
to appellate review. In all probability, public interest would be bet-
ter served if the agency which administers the zoning regulations
were permitted to appear and justify its actions in appellate pro-
ceedings.
LABOR AGENCIEs
When a labor agency administering a fund attempts an appeal
from an adverse judicial ruling, the public interest involved is
fairly obvious. This view is supported also by the contention that
the agency is pecuniarily aggrieved since a decision which denies
a claimant's rights to benefits may be res judicata of the employer's
liability for contribution in any subsequent action brought by the
agency.2 4
However, as in the zoning cases, courts have reached conflict-
ing conclusions when construing labor statutes which were identical
in all save minor details. To illustrate, the state unemployment com-
pensation agencies of Washington and North Carolina allowed
claims which were reversed. The statute in each instance provided
that the agency should be a party to any judicial review of its de-
However, in a later decision, the same Court of Appeals overruled a zoning
board's motion to dismiss the appeal of a property owner from the judg-
ment of the court of common pleas which had affirmed the board's order.
Previously, it had been decided in the Di Cillo case that the zoning statutes
contain no provision authorizing an appeal by a board of zoning appeals
from an adverse judgment of the court of common pleas. Since the zoning
statutes are equally silent as to the right of appeal by a property owner from
an unfavorable ruling by the court of common pleas, the board in the in-
stant case logically maintained that the property owner should also be
bound by the lower court's judgment. The Court of Appeals rejected this
reasoning and held that the board had been denied the right to appeal
because it cannot be considered injuriously affected, whereas there could
be no question that the property owner was a "party aggrieved" and there-
fore authorized to prosecute an appeal under the general appellate statutes.
Ohio State Students' Trailer Park Co-op., Inc., v. County of Franklin, Ohio, No.
4937, August 14, 1953.
23 In Miles v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 Atl. 540 (1938), at page 562, the
Maryland Court stated, "Moreover, apart from statute, the general rule is that
a municipality has the same right to appeal as any other litigant"
24 Goetten, Unemployment Compensation- Right of Administrative Ag-
ency to Appeal from Court Reversal, 30 GEo. L.J. 277 (1942).
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termination and that appeals should be allowed to aggrieved parties
as in other civil disputes. 25 In both cases the appeals were taken
by the agencies and not by the claimants. The North Carolina
court held that the agency had no right to appeal since the real
party in interest is the claimant and nothing in the statute, which
makes the commission a party to any judicial action involving its
decisions, constitutes it a guardian or trustee for the claimant.2
However, the Washington Court reached the contrary result and
found that the agency has the right of an "aggrieved party" to
appeal from judgments adverse to its rulings in matters involving
interpretation of the compensation act.2 7 The court said, "If the
commission cannot by appeal present the question to this court,
the decision of an important question may be indefinitely postponed
to the great prejudice of the public.232 8
Protection of a pooled account from possible depletion due to
erroneous decisions has been held sufficient justification for an
appeal by a state commissioner of labor who administered the
state unemployment compensation law.29 Permission was granted
a compensation board to appeal independently of the parties to the
action as a representative of the public interest and on the theory
that a statute which allowed the board to appear in proceedings
questioning its decisions carried with it the right to defend such
decision in the higher courts. 30
When the agency does not administer a fund but operates in
the field of labor relations, it has been held either that the agency
is charged in the public interest with the prevention of unfair
labor practices and therefore is authorized and under a duty to pro-
2S WASH. RV. CODE 1951, Tit. 50, § 50.32.120 [WAsH. REv. STAT. (RxEqMMN,
Sup. 1939) §§ 9998-10 (h) (i)J; N.C. GEN. STAT. 1943, § 96-15h [N.C. Pub.
Laws, Extra Sess. 1936, ch. 1 §§ 6 (h) (i), N.C. CoDE § 632 (Michie, 1935)].
26 
rn re Mitchell, 220 N. C. 65, 16 S.E. 2d. 476 (1941). Basis for dismissal of
appeal in Phillips, Claimant; West. U. Tel. Co., Employer; State of N.C. on re-
lation of Employ. Security Comm. of N.C., 234 N.C. 453 (1951).
27 In re Foy, 10 Wash. 2d. 317, 116 P. 2d. 545 (1941). This decision is sup-
ported by Oak Woods Cemetery Association v. Murphy, Director of Labor,
383 IlI. 301, 50 N.. 2d. 582 (1943).
23 In re Foy, supra note 27 at 325.
29 Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co. v. Olsen, Commissioner of Ne-
braska State Dept. of Labor, 141 Neb. 12, 2 N. W. 2d. 353 (1942).
30 Workaen's Compensation Board v. Abbott, 212 Ky. 123, 278 & W. 553
(1925). Contra, Board of Review Created by Okla. Security Act v. Codding, 199
Okla. 231, 185 P. 2d. 702 (1937); Pearce v. ND. Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, 68 N.D. 78, 27G N.W. 917 (1947). In the Pearce case, the judgment
of the court was not adverse to the board but the board appealed for the
reason that the court erred in its findings of fact.
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tect its rulings on appeal,81 or that the agency as a quasi-judicial
body should not be permitted to become a litigant and the advocate
of one or other of the parties which has appeared before it.32
LIQUOR AGENCIES
Similar differences of opinion have been expressed by the
courts in liquor agency cases. The liberal theory has been followed
in Arkansas where a county judge, whose denial of a liquor license
was reversed by a circuit court, was allowed to appeal from the
reversal as a representative of the county's interest.33
Similarly, the State Comptroller of Texas was permitted an
appeal from an adverse decision as to the vacating of a liquor
license. Although the statute in question contained no provision
relating to appeal, the court allowed it under the general law.34
This theory was more recently followed by an Ohio court of
appeals when, on two occasions, it ruled that the Ohio Board of
Liquor Control may appeal from an adverse ruling of the court
of common pleas.35 The court pointed out that the statute which
provides for appeal by an aggrieved person from the Board's de-
cision also states that the trial "shall proceed as in the trial of a
civil action and the courts shall determine the rights of the parties
in accordance with the statutes or other laws applicable to such
action." 30 The court then concluded that since the general law con-
fers the right to the appeal upon the parties to a civil action, the
Board, having been a party to the proceeding in the lower court,
fulfilled the statutory requirements.
However, this proposition was rejected by the Supreme Court
of Ohio in the Corn case.3 7 In that decision the Court held that
the agency could not look beyond the Administrative Procedure
Act to find a right to appeal. The Supreme Court observed that
granting the right to appeal rests with the Ohio General Assembly
since, in its opinion, the problem is legislative rather than judicial.
31 International Union, United Automobile Aircraft and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 245
Wis. 417, 14 N.W. 2d. 872 (1949).
32 Pa. Labor Relations Board v. Heinel Motors, Inc., 344 Pa. 238, 25 A.
2d. 306 (1942).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said at page 240, "For the board to
become a litigant is repugnant to the traditional common law heritage of ju-
dicial detachment and freedom from interest."
See also Note, 90 U. PA. L. RPv. 969 (1942).
33 Ouachita County v. Rolland, 60 Ark. 516, 31 S. W. 144 (1893).
34 Lane, Comptroller v. Hewgley, 155 S. W. 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
-
35 Barn Cafe and Restaurant, Inc., v. Board of Liquor Control, 63 Ohio
L. Abs. 348, 107 N. E. 2d. 631 (App. 1952).
State v. Tancer, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 367, 107 N.E. 2d. 532, (App. 1952).
36 Omo Rsv. CODE § 119.12 (1953). [Omo GEN. CoDE § 154-73].
37 Corn v. Board of Liquor Control, supra note 1.
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SCHOOL AND TAX AGENCIES
School Agencies
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Moede v. Board of County
Com'rs of Stearns County,38 ruled that a board of county commis-
sioners, as the representative of the public to whom is entrusted the
matter of forming school districts, may appeal from an order of the
district court reversing its action in establishing a new district.
However, in a later decision,39 the court recognized that it had
taken a contrary position in Kirchoff v. Board of Com'rs of Mc-
Leod County.40 In the Kirchoff case, the Supreme Court held that
the Board of County Commissioners, acting as the tribunal to hear
and pass upon a petition to detach land from one school district
and attach it to another, has no interest in the litigation and is not
an aggrieved party entitled to appeal. No attempt is made to recon-
cile these decisions, although the conflict is noted.
In the Bricelyn case,41 the court relied on the Kirchoff decision
in support of its ruling that on appeal the Board of County Com-
missioners was not a party sufficiently interested to question the
constitutionality of the School District Reorganization Act. An
exception has been declared to exist when the public interest is
involved.42 The Minnesota Supreme Court held, however, that an
interest of a board in the proper exercise of its official functions
does not constitute a public interest.43 The court, while narrowly
restricting the meaning of public interest, neglected to explain the
circumstances or conditions which must be met to come within its
definition. It is difficult to conceive of situations involving the pub-
lic interest which do not bear a significant relationship to the ex-
ercise of official duties. The interdependence of activities as well
as the interconnecting relations between policy and functions
are such as to make the distinction voiced by the Minnesota court
untenable.
Tax Agencies
In tax cases, in the absence of an explicit statutory authori-
zation of a right of appeal, the view also has been maintained that
a board is without authority to request the review of an adverse
38 43 Minn. 312, 45 N.W. 435 (1890). This decision is supported in Board
of Com'rs. of Carter County v. Woodford Consol. School Dist. No. 36, 165 OkIa.
227, 25 P. 2d. 1057 (1933).
39 Bricelyn School Dist. No. 132 v. Board of County Con'rs. of Faribault
County, 55 N. W. 2d. 602 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1952). See footnote 2, p. 604.
40189 Minn. 226, 248 N. W. 817 (1933).
41 Supra note 39.
42 Id. at 604.
43 Ibid.
1953]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
judicial ruling.44 Thus, the Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled that
the entry of a decree for costs against a board of assessors of a
waterworks district did not justify an appeal by the board in the
absence of any other interest.4 5 However, the high court of Mary-
land took the contrary position as to review when it allowed an ap-
peal of its state tax commission from a reversal of assessments made
by the commission.4 0
A Louisiana court denied the right of appeal to a sheriff when
he acted as an ex officio tax collector.47 The same jurisdiction de-
clared that a person who named a tax collector as a party to a suit
for the revocation of a tax title, made by the collector to the state,
was estopped by her judicial admission of his competency to ques-
tion his power to appeal from a reversal of his action.48
The West Virginia Supreme Court, in construing a statute
which provided that a taxpayer who feels aggrieved by the assess-
ment of his land may appeal to the county court and then to the
circuit court, held that the statute contained no language recog-
nizing the county court as a party to the appeal or indicating
that the court is authorized to seek a review of the circuit court's
decision.4 9
MISCELLANEOUs AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS
A discursive examination reveals that this judicial conflict
prevails also as to appeals by other agencies and officials. A com-
mon council,50 a county board of supervisors,5' and a former com-
missioner of public safety 52 were held not to be sufficiently inter-
ested in the proceedings to entitle them to appeal from judgments
reinstating officials removed by them. However, a mayor was al-
lowed to appeal from a decision reinstating the chief of police be-
cause the responsibility for the chief's conduct must be borne by
the executive department.5 3
44 Board of Assessors of Waterworks Dist. No. 2 of Texarkana v. Texarkana
Water Corp., 125 Ark. 323, 188 S. W. 808 (1916).
4S Ibid.
4 6 State Tax Comm. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 188 Md. 240, 52 A. 2d 615
(1947).
47 State ex rel Young v. Sanders, Sheriff, 111 La. 188, 35 So. 509 (1903).
48 Smith v. City of New Orleans, 43 La. 726, 9 So. 773 (1891).
49 Mackin v. Taylor County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 18 S.. 2d 632 (1893).
SO State ex re. Kempster v. Common Council of City of Milwaukee, 90
Wis. 487, 63 N.W. 751 (1895).
51 McCarty v. Board of Sup'rs of Ashland County, 61 Wis. 1, 20 N.W. 654
(1884).
S2 Rox v. Doherty, 284 N.Y. 550, 32 N.E. 2d 549 (1940).
s3 Gray, Mayor v. State ex rel. Putnam, Chief of Police. 24 Ohio App. 445,
157 N.E. 905 (1927).
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Ordinarily a judge54 or a justice of the peace s5 is not deemed
aggrieved by a reversal of his ruling, but where a statute provided
that the judge shall defend in appeals as the representative of the
county, the judge was allowed to appeal.5 6
Pecuniary interest was the basis for the allowance of an appeal
by a county board from a judgment for costs67 and a judgment
requiring the board to pay out money under a contract canceled
by the court,"8 whereas public interest justified an appeal by land
commissioners 9 and an irrigation district.60
A highway commissioner who refused to issue a driver's li-
cense,6 ' a registration commission which would not register a
voter,62 and commissioners of a department of agriculture and mar-
kets who refused a showman's license63 were held to have no per-
sonal interest warranting an appeal from decisions reversing their
rulings, but a recorder of mortgages was allowed to appeal even
though the court found that his only interest was that of sustain-
ing his interpretation in matters affecting property in which he
had no personal interest.6 4
A statute which required a public service commission to file
an answer to an appeal taken from its action made it a party to
the record entitling it to appeal 65 and the absence of a provision
54 Mackin v. Taylor County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 18 S.E- 2d. 632 (1893);
Sumpter County Judge v. Buchanan, 88 Ark, 118, 113 S. W. 809 (1908);
Bowles v. Dannin, Judge of Probate, 2 A. 2d. 892 (R.I Sup. Ct. 1938); People
ex rel. Breslin v. Lawrence, Justice of Supreme Court, 107 N.Y. 607, 15 N.Z.
187 (1888); Coupland v. Tullar, 21 Tex. 523 (1858).
SS Onion, Justice of Peace v. Cain, 64 S.W. 2d. 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933);
McCloskey v. Kenfro, 47 Ariz. 534, 57 P. 2d. 1140 (1936).
S6 Ouachita County v. Rolland, 60 Ark. 576, 31 S.W. 144 (1895); Cleburne
County v. Morton, 69 Ark. 48, 60 S.W. 307 (1900).
5 7 Fitch v. Hay, 112 App. Div. 736, 98 N.Y.S. 1090 (1906).
58 Board of Com'rs. of Dubois County v. Cave, 192 Ind. 152, 132 N.E. 631
(1921).
59 People ex rel. Burnham v. Jones, Land Commissioners, 110 N.Y. 509,
18 N.E. 432 (1888).
60 In re Heart River Irr. Dist. Stark v. Heart River Irr. Dist., 47 N.W.
2d. 126 (ND. Sup. Ct. 1951).
6 1 Helland v. Jones, 37 N.W. 2d. 513 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1949).
6 2 In re Moskowitz, 329 Pa. 183, 196 A. 498 (1938).
63 Clark v. Hill, 208 Wis. 575, 243 N.W. 502 (1932).
In this case the trial was favorable to the commissioners but they ap-
pealed because they disagreed with the reasons for the judgment.
64 Carrere v. Reddix, 210 La. 776, 28 So. 2d. 267 (1946).
6SPublic Service Commission v. B. and 0. RE. Co., 260 Pa. 323, 103
AtI. 724 (1918); and companion cases, Public Service Commission v. Phil.
and R.R. Co., 260 Pa. 327, 103 Atl. 725 (1918); Public Service Service Com-
mission v. Central R.R. Co., 260 Pa. 328, 103 Ati. 725 (1918).
See also People ex rel. South Share Traction Co. v. Willcox, Public
Service Commission, First District, 196 N.Y. 212, 89 N.E. 459 (1909).
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for appeal in the act creating a railroad commission did not give
rise to an inference against the right sufficiently strong to prevent
the commission from prosecuting an appeal under the general
law.66 In the latter case, the court found that the public is in ef-
fect the plaintiff in an investigation by the commission.
Tim LEGAL PROCESS
Although the decisions of courts which have adjudicated the
right of an agency to appeal from an adverse ruling divide on the
issue of strict or liberal construction of the statutes which govern
specific proceedings, the issue involved is far more fundamental,
penetrating the core of our legal process.
In primitive society, the law dealt only with activities which
threatened breach of peace. Today it assumes a more compelling
role since it is charged with implementing social policy. Thus,
where law, in earlier times, concerned itself only with prohibitive
and adjudicative functions, it now also has affirmative responsi-
bilities in satisfying human wants and expectations. 7 This has
meant the transmutation of the fundamental elements of the com-
mon law which the judiciary and the bar have often found disturb-
ing.
Thus, modern law is more than a medium for dealing with dis-
putes or a guide as to what officials will do. Its growing concern
is with implementing social policy, too often as not, the policy
being inarticulated and elusive. There is little wonder, then, for the
increasing growth in judicial discrepancies and conflicts.
The need for precise study of the trends in decision and the
factors which influence legal results is becoming increasingly evi-
dent. The shortcomings of the present practices have been describ-
ed by many writers, more recently by Professor Myres McDougal.
McDougal states that "Little effective effort is made to relate de-
cisions to basic community values or, when discrepancies are ob-
served, to clarify values and adopt a creative attitude in the in-
vention and adaption of new means."0 8
6 6 State ex rel. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. R.R. Commission of Washing-
ton, 60 Wash. 218, 110 Pac. 1075 (1910).
67 Professor Hurst described the more recent developments as follows:
"The stock nineteenth-century model of a legal rule was the admonition to
be good, coupled with the penalty for being bad. Twentieth-century law saw
a major shift toward preventive, positive, framework-building use of the pow-
er of the political community. This was a natural corollary both of the so-
cial facts that pressed us to rationalize social institutions and of the value
that experience with rationalization taught us to put upon it"
Hurst, Changing Popular Views About Law and Lawyers, 287 ANNair,
1, 5 (1953).
68 McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes, 61 YArx
L. J. 915, 920 (1952).
At an earlier date, Professor Kocourek, noting this limitation of the ju-
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The inability of the judiciary to cope effectively with modern
social and economic issues and its failure to weigh and articulate
policy adequately, influenced the rapid development of legislative
and administrative law. Notwithstanding their incapacity to cope
with many current problems, the courts have been unwilling to
make room for the other legal processes. The judicial hostility to
administrative law, which still persists, is characteristic of the
earlier attitude towards legislation. There was a time when the
judges seemed to disfavor all statute law. Sir Frederick Pollock
relates that the English judges in construing a statute operated "on
the theory that Parliament generally changes the law for the worse,
and that the business of the judges is to keep the mischief of its
interference within the narrowest possible bounds." 69 This antagon-
ism to legislation has also prevailed among the American judges.
But despite such fulmination, the legislative and administrative
processes have assumed increasing responsibility over the satisfac-
tion of social demands and requirements.
Apparently, the judicial opposition to administrative appeal
is another illustration of this hostility. Many American judges
look askance upon the agencies and their overlapping of legislative,
judicial, and executive functions, in what appears as shocking con-
flict with the traditional concept of the separation of powers.
This judicial sentiment has found support among many prac-
ticing attorneys who contend that agency appeal would be tanta-
mount to granting the state and local government an undue ad-
vantage over the private litigant. To what extent this opposition
is based on a fear of adverse appellate rulings to their clients is
indeterminable. They show little or no concern, when a right of
appeal is disallowed, over the resulting postponement of decisions
to the likely detriment of the public. This attitude is a sequel to
that voiced against the state when the prosecution has attempted
to appeal in criminal cases.
In fairness to the attorneys, however, it should be noted that
their fear is not without some foundation. The agencies generally
have adequate personnel and funds to appeal each adverse de-
cision regardless of its merit or importance, whereas the private
litigant, even when he feels that his rights are unfairly invaded,
diciary, stated, "For the larger part, in the application of law, inquiry into
purpose is foreign to the judicial process."
KocoumEK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF LAW, 169 (1930).
Even the skeptic, Mr. Justice Holmes, looked to the time "when the
part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and
instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of the
ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them." Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HAxv. L. Rsv. 457, 474 (1397).69 PoLLocx, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHcs, 85 (1880).
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may be unable to meet the expenses of appellate proceedings. This
could place the private litigant in an unfair position and force him
to submit to what in his opinion is unreasonable or arbitrary ad-
ministrative action. But abuses arising from administrative re-
view could be forestalled or controlled by legislative investigation
and action. An awareness of possible legislative discipline should
discourage administrative misuse of authority.
A balancing of interests seems to favor administrative appeal,
since the agency's existence bespeaks a social need or demand.
An agency should be allowed to appeal like any private litigant,
for, as a representative of the many, it is charged with a public
responsibility and interest. The structure of a social organization
provides little reason for penalizing the group it represents. Nor
should the judicial functions of the agency, which have no direct
bearing on its substantive operations, preclude the full review of
administrative interpretation, whether sustainable or not. Its func-
tions which relate to the administration of a public program, should
not be likened to those of the judiciary, the latter being without af-
firmative power. Where the judicial operations of an agency are
incidental to its positive, administrative program, the former should
not be assigned a relationship out of line with its import. Even in
the absence of rule-making authority, the adjudicative functions of
an agency, guided by legislative policy, assume a pattern unlike pri-
vate litigation. There the agency performs an affirmative role
through the enforcement of statute law. To allow full and complete
review of its interpretation of the legislation, an agency with ad-
judicative responsibilities should also have equal right to appeal.
The administration of a public program, whether through the rule-
making or the adjudicative process, transcends the narrow limits
of disputes and the essentially negative judicial duties.
Further, where a statute is silent or unclear as to administra-
tive appeal, permitting review is in keeping with the more modern
legal tenets. The era of formalism has long since passed. Procedural
matters, except for jurisdictional and other issues which go to the
heart of a controversy, should not be the basis for disallowing an
appeal by an administrative agency. The right of an agency to
defend a suit should carry with it a right of review.
The right to appeal should rest with an administrative agency
to reduce the conflicts stemming from unreviewed agency de-
cisions and subsequent reversals of policy by the courts involv-
ing the same subjectmatter but different parties. In the event
that appeal is not allowed, the administrative rule remains unset-
tled and the rights of interested parties uncertain.
The exercise of judicial review over administrative agencies
has not infrequently raised questions as to the qualifications of the
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lower courts to consider such matters. The officials of an agency
develop an expertise with respect to its delegated functions which
the judiciary, with its wide range of other litigation, cannot pos-
sibly emulate. When judicial review is general to many lower
courts, it is not unlikely that they may render diverse, conflicting
decisions. In that event, a uniformity of administrative policy is
absent from the program and the complexities of overall adminis-
tration are substantially increased. While it is beyond the scope of
this discussion to consider the merits of an administrative court
with singular authority to review agency decisions, the confusion
resulting from judicial discordancies and conflicts should be mini-
mized by granting the right of review to all disputants, public or
private, regardless of the appellate court structure.
LEGISLATION IN OHIO
The courts have repeatedly claimed that the solution to this
controversy rests with the legislatures since the administrative
process is created by statute. While some courts have seen the ef-
ficacy of administrative appeal and have liberally interpreted legis-
lation to allow review, other jurisdictions have adhered strictly
and literally to the statutory texts.
As indicated by the Corm case, 70 Ohio falls within the latter
group. Inspired by that decision, on July 18, 1953, just thirty-eight
days after the Corn ruling, the Ohio General Assembly, recognizing
its serious implications, partially resolved the problem by allowing
appeal to those agencies which are covered by the Administrative
Procedure Act. The Assembly amended the Act to provide that:
"The judgment of the court (of common pleas) shall be final
and conclusive unless reversed, vacated or modified on appeal.
Such appeals may be taken either by the party or the agency and
shall proceed as in the case of appeals in civil actions as provided
in Sections 2505.1 to 2505.45, inclusive of the Revised Code."7' 1
This Ohio legislation undoubtly clarifies the appeal process of
those state agencies responsible to the Administrative Procedure
70Corn v. Board of Liquor Control, supra note 1.
710mo REv. CoDE § 119.12 (1953), as amended in S.B. No. 342, 100th Gen-
eral Assembly, Regular Session, (1953-1954).
The remainder of the amendment provided:
"Such appeals by the agency shall be taken on questions of law relating
to the constitutionality, construction, or interpretation of statutes and rules
and regulations of the agency and in such appeal the court may also review
and determine the correctness of the judgment of the court of common
pleas that the order of the agency is not supported by any reliable, probative
and substantial evidence in the entire record.
"Such appeals may be taken regardless of the fact that a proceeding was
pending prior to the amendment of this section expressly authorizing such
appeals, provided such appeals are perfected by the filing of notice of appeal
within the time prescribed by section 2505.07 of the Revised Code."
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Act but leaves unsettled the right of review by zoning boards. In
the absence of explicit legislative permission, such boards must
continue to administer their programs without the benefit of re-
view from adverse judicial decisions.
It is recommended that the Ohio Legislature, consistent with
its recent action, broaden the scope of administrative review to
include the zoning boards and the other agencies which are still
without the appeal authority.7 2
7 2 Recently, the Maryland legislature amended its zoning statute to provide
that:
"The Court shall grant the Board and other proper parties a reasonable
time to answer and shall require either the original paper or certified copies
thereof, which constituted the entire record before the Board, to be filed with
the Board's answer." Acts 1953, ch. 696, p. 1569.
This legislation should leave no doubt that the board is a proper party
to the initial appeal from its decision by the party aggrieved, but does not
answer the question of the board's right to appeal from a reversal by a
lower court. It would appear that more explicit legislative language is
necessary to overrule the Miles case, supra note 10.
[Vrol. 14
